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PROPONENTS OF FREE MARKETS often push boundaries concerning 
which social and economic problems can be addressed in the absence of the 
state. For instance, by extending the work of Ronald Coase and Elinor 
Ostrom, economists have cast doubt on whether governments are the best 
institution for resolving important issues, even when markets do not conform 
to the idealized perfectly competitive model (e.g., Boettke 2010). In the 
extreme version of this argument, proponents of the purely market-based 
institutional framework known as anarcho-capitalism attempt to show that 
eliminating the state altogether will yield the best feasible institutions. While 
those who are unfamiliar with this position may not find it credible, 
discussions of how the relevant mechanisms of change would work are 
common (e.g., Dixit 2004, Leeson 2014; for a literature review, cf. Stringham 
and Powell 2009). 
Traditional criticisms of anarcho-capitalism have centered on whether 
the Hobbesian war of all against all would arise in the absence of the state 
(Bush 1972). The literature on anarcho-capitalism has therefore sought to 
determine under which conditions groups can cooperate with one another. 
Scholars have been able to identify historical examples of cooperation among 
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groups in the absence of the state, regardless of the size and heterogeneity1 of 
the group (Bernstein 1992; Greif 1993; Clay 1997), and even regardless of the 
virtue and temperament of the individuals composing the group (Leeson 
2007). If it is true then that the state is not strictly necessary even to maintain 
law and order, government has little justification at all. 
However, this paper presents a different criticism of anarchy. It 
challenges the primary articulated mechanism that determines the rights of 
third parties to exchanges. Examples of these third parties include children, 
animals, and the environment. I do not argue that in an anarcho-capitalist 
society individuals will fail to pay the costs of enforcing the rights of third 
parties such as children. Rather, I argue that heterogeneous moral visions 
may lead to conflicts that will be difficult to resolve in the way anarcho-
capitalists typically describe, whereas these conflicts are resolved tolerably 
well under the state (that is, so as to maintain peace, not that one must 
applaud present day policy choices regarding the rights of third parties). 
II. Rights of Third Parties in Anarcho-Capitalism 
One perspective on how anarcho-capitalist society would function in 
practice is articulated by David Friedman (1989).2 In place of public police 
and courts, the rights of individuals would be protected by a wide array of 
competing security firms, insurance firms, and private arbitrators. The 
anarcho-capitalist argues the pressures of market competition would diminish 
the inefficiencies of bureaucracy while unleashing the innovative powers of 
the market upon them. While renegade firms may arise on occasion, firms 
generally will find it in their self-interest to use peaceful means of resolving 
disputes. 
One example Friedman offers concerns how firms would determine 
whether or not drugs would be legal in the stateless society. Some groups 
                                                          
1 “Heterogeneity” refers to differences such as ethnic group. One argument suggests 
that cooperation would break down if the group is not sufficiently homogenous, as 
homogeneity helps prevent the Hobbesian outcome. This is not “heterogeneity” in the 
sense used in this paper, as it is distinct from the Hobbesian war of all against all. 
2 There are numerous alternative models and rationales of anarcho-capitalism, most 
notably Rothbard (1970), which are similar qualitatively to that of Friedman. The 
objection developed within this paper applies to these alternatives insofar as they make 
use of the willingness-to-pay mechanism to resolve the conflicts described below. 
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would want drugs to be legal, others illegal.3 Each group would be willing to 
pay a certain sum of money to its firm in exchange for enforcing its favored 
policy. Under competitive pressures, whichever group is willing to pay more 
would see the policy enacted and the other group compensated through side 
payments, with firms acting as intermediaries. In addition to compensating 
the other group, those who wish that drugs be kept out of the community 
must be willing to pay for enforcement. Due to all this, Friedman argues 
drugs would likely be legal in stateless societies, but ultimately, it is an 
empirical question. However, regardless of which group is willing to pay 
more, there is a far greater sense that the rule chosen would be efficient. 
These mechanisms, however, would likely also decide the most 
contentious social issues in Western societies: those concerning the rights of 
third parties. These include, for example, abortion, animal rights, the 
environment, and the legality of female circumcision. Regardless of whether 
we believe these issues should be decided this way, the question is, can and 
would the traditional anarcho-capitalist solution permit the peaceful 
reconciliation of different moral visions? That is, can Friedman’s mechanism 
resolve conflict over issues such as transactions bearing on animal rights?4 
A closely related question worth acknowledging is that many 
economists and philosophers who support free markets have implicitly 
argued that a correct understanding of markets and economists would 
encourage people to accept such repugnant transactions (Brennan and 
Jaworksi, forthcoming; cf. Munger 2011). That is, individuals should be willing 
to engage even in transactions that many find morally repugnant.5 To these 
scholars, failure to accept the legitimacy of such transactions just as any 
others arises from ignorance or a bias against markets. One classic example 
of this view concerns the market for human organs. In response to Alvin 
Roth winning the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in part for 
figuring out how to effectively get kidneys to those who need them, without 
using markets, one prominent free-market proponent commented that Roth 
“[figured] out the best way to allocate kidneys subject to the constraint that 
you’re too damned dumb to use the price system.”6 Another example is 
                                                          
3 Clearly, this is a simplification of the wide array of opinions concerning how society 
should view drugs; the discussion is meant merely to provide a tangible example. 
4 A similar objection to my argument is that it will create significant moral hazard 
problems. Cf. Buchanan (2000). 
5 The issues explored throughout this paper are very special (and extreme) instances 
of repugnancy costs. Cf. Roth (2007) for the more general problem outlined. 
6 Cf. Landsburg (2012). 
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parents’ perception of the amount of risk they expose their children to; 
parents often selectively—and inconsistently—behave as if exposing children 
to any risk whatsoever is morally repulsive, as documented and ridiculed at 
length by journalist Lenore Skenazy (2010). One proponent of markets 
celebrated Skenazy’s book as “the application of the economic way of 
thinking to parenthood” (Horwitz 2010). Apart from how economists view 
human behavior, there is a sense among these economists that, if people do 
not weigh tradeoffs as models of economic rationality predict they will, they 
err, perhaps even morally. 
Again, my argument does not concern whether consumers, voters, 
organ donors, or parents should weigh these tradeoffs as a simple economic 
model would predict. Rather, as I will show, Friedman’s model adopts an 
important but unstated assumption that actors must view the decision to pay 
or accept money in exchange for a community’s policy on abortion or animal 
rights as another market transaction. The tenability of the traditional picture 
of anarcho-capitalism sketched above rests on this assumption. 
III. Equilibrium in the Market for the Rights of Third Parties 
Economists typically assume there is a price for everything. When 
members of the public claim there is no price they would be willing to accept 
in exchange for a good or service, economists reply by raising 
counterexamples demonstrating that in real life people do in fact have a price 
they are willing to pay. Some parents choose a slightly faster, yet slightly more 
dangerous, commuting route to save time, even if they elsewhere claim they 
place infinite value on the lives of their children. And it is a standard trope in 
fiction that even the most moral among us can rationalize unsavory behavior 
if enough money flashes before our eyes. 
Economists’ predictions are most apt when rebutting people who claim 
to have lexicographic preferences—meaning, they would trade all their wealth and 
resources for one more unit of a good (say, their child’s safety). Descriptively, 
nearly any claim of lexicographic preferences is simply false; talk is cheap. 
The unrealism of this preferences type, however, does not mean individuals 
do not require a premium to take part in a transaction they view to be 
immoral. In fact, according to much research in psychology, people do 
regularly demand such premiums. Transactions for which such a premium is 
required are known as taboo tradeoffs (Fiske and Tetlock 1997). 
Individuals tend to compartmentalize sacred values—distinguishing 
values one “cannot put a price on” from ordinary market values. Tetlock et 
al. (2000) test the implications of the Sacred-Value-Protection Model, which 
sees individuals as taking costly actions to compartmentalize values rather 
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than maximize utility, narrowly defined. The model implies that, when asked 
to consider trading money off against goods that “should” have infinite 
worth, individuals respond emotionally to prevent any consideration of 
tradeoffs (or at least to maintain the illusion that they never consider such 
payoffs). In the words of Tetlock et al., to maintain their true identity (or at 
least their perceived identity), “people who function like intuitive scientists or 
economists in one setting can be quickly transformed into intuitive moralists-
theologians when provoked by assaults on sacred values.” 
These authors established in a laboratory environment that asking 
individuals to make the types of decisions private insurance and security firms 
would make leads them to moral outrage, and furthermore, to undertaking 
costly activities to affirm their values. After asking participants to 
contemplate legalizing various taboo transactions (e.g., selling adoption rights 
or organs), experimenters asked participants to sign up to help a fictitious 
political action group fight against legalization. Participants were more than 
willing to volunteer. 
Elsewhere, McGraw et al. (2003) explicitly calculate differentials in 
willingness-to-pay associated with the psychology of the taboo. They 
calculate ratios of willingness-to-accept to willingness-to-pay (WTA/WTP), 
by the social relationship the economic transaction is impinging upon. The 
median increase in these ratios varied from 1.50 to 2.07 depending on the 
social relationship, while the ratio for exchanges normally determined by 
markets was 1.25 (i.e., for endowment effects alone).7 This means the 
premium consumers required to violate the norm was 50-107 percent greater 
than the price they would be willing to pay for the same physical good. 
An even more pertinent experiment is performed by Ginges et al. 
(2007). The authors consider one of the most controversial issues of modern 
times, the Israeli-Palestinian dispute: “Our experiments tested the general 
hypothesis that, when reasoning about sacred values, people would not apply 
instrumental (cost-benefit) calculations but would instead apply deontological 
(moral) rules or intuitions.” Ginges et al. measured levels of outrage and 
propensity for violence among 601 Jewish Israelis and 535 Palestinian 
refugees (including members of Hamas), given a set of compromises. While 
individuals in practice do not attach infinite monetary worth to sacred values, 
attempts at offering monetary incentives tend to backfire. Rather, the 
experiment determined it is symbolic gestures—hardly within the realm of 
hard economic calculation—that improve the ability of the groups to 
compromise. 
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Research in psychology has established that, when confronted with a 
taboo tradeoff, consumers need additional financial incentives to engage in a 
transaction that violates values they believe to be sacred. Non-economists 
may find this intuitive, but it creates serious issues for the Friedmanite 
solution to the problem of heterogeneous moral perspectives. To see 
precisely why this is the case, let us briefly set aside concerns about taboo 
tradeoffs. 
If tradeoffs are not taboo,8 there is a continuous relationship between 
supply and demand. As argued by Philip Wicksteed, in such cases demand 
and supply are mirror images of one another (1933: 797-798). Those who 
demand (express a willingness to pay) become those who supply (express a 
willingness to accept), depending on the reservation price of others. Under 
these conditions, if those who wish to pay to ban consumption of animal 
products are unable or unwilling to compensate those who wish to consume 
them, it necessarily implies those who wish to consume animal products (for 
example) can afford to compensate those who wish to ban this practice. 
Figure 1 demonstrates why. In graph A, the demand curve does not intersect 
the supply curve at a positive price. In graph B, those who wish to legitimize 
consumption are willing and able to compensate those who wish to ban it. 
Per Wicksteed, this is necessarily true because the demand curve in graph A is 
really just the supply curve in graph B, while the demand curve in graph B is 
really just the supply curve in graph A. This is made explicit in graph C. 
If we reintroduce the premium required to secure agreement in a taboo 
tradeoff, the situation becomes decidedly less optimistic. Figure 2 introduces 
the discontinuity between supply and demand when the firms’ customers are 
asked whether they are willing to take a side payment in exchange for 
accepting the fact that the community will not reflect the moral beliefs of the 
customer. Otherwise, the situation is identical to that in Figure 1. As it is 
drawn, there is no equilibrium in the market for legitimizing or banning the 
consumption of animal products. In other words, we should not expect that 
side payments will prevent conflict.9 
                                                          
8 We assume also that there are no other endowment or similar effects obfuscating 
the analysis. It should be noted that taboo tradeoffs do not involve traditional 
endowment effects, though in some ways they appear similar. 
9 One additional simplifying assumption is that the taboo tradeoff will inhibit 
willingness to accept but not willingness to pay. It is not difficult to imagine consumers 
willing to pay an agency promising to protect pets in the community. Rather, the taboo 
tradeoff arises, for example, when consumers are asked to accept money in exchange for 
allowing certain pets in their community to be tortured. It does not appear that dropping 
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Equilibria for these markets are still possible. That supply and demand 
curves are shaped as Wicksteed describes is a sufficient, but not a necessary 
condition. The question is how contrasting positions are to be reconciled 
when there is no equilibrium. Civil society and social norms are two possible 
answers. Yet civil war could result instead. Regardless, the literature on 
anarchy is centered almost entirely on whether the narrow Hobbesian war of 
all against all will arise, and has neglected whether behavioral responses will 
raise confounding issues if markets radically displace government. 
A further point should be made about especially contentious moral 
disputes such as those involving abortion. I note emphatically that one 
cannot simply claim abortions are legal by default in an anarcho-capitalist 
community, and that the above analysis is therefore superfluous. The market 
mechanism would clearly be the driving force protecting, for instance, 
children within the community who are not part of one’s own family. In this 
                                                                                                                                     
the assumption, such that consumers would feel the taboo tradeoff on both sides of the 
market, would improve the functioning of the market; indeed, it would further inhibit it. 
Relaxing this assumption would strengthen the case, not weaken it. 
48 LIBERTARIAN PAPERS 7 (1), (2015) 
case, it seems fairly obvious there would be sufficient demand to protect the 
rights of all children. The hard cases are precisely those that are more 
contentious. But the only sense (besides a moral one) in which abortions are 
legal by default is that those wishing to make them illegal would need to pay 
for enforcement.10 
Moreover, there is no reason that rejecting a transaction such as this 
must be thought of as irrational. The idea that one is not the type of person 
to put a dollar amount on certain things may illustrate what Akerlof and 
Kranton (2010) call identity economics, and identity may well enter the utility 
function of many individuals.11 Perhaps economists are correct to argue that 
consumers should be less skeptical of how markets deal with taboo subjects, 
but that would return us to normative analysis. Descriptively, consumers do 
require a premium for engaging in these types of transactions, and for the 
purposes here, that is what matters. 
 
                                                          
10 It is worth noting that those who claim these issues would settle to a default 
position often normatively support said positions. 
11 A more cynical (though not clearly incorrect) view might see this as a social 
signaling problem. If it is, the analysis remains unchanged. 
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IV. Objections and Caveats 
Proponents of anarcho-capitalism may point to historical examples of 
stateless societies as evidence that the types of issues raised here were not 
significant enough to prevent law, order, and peace from arising. However, I 
do not claim that other mechanisms or institutions can allow a stateless 
society to overcome the problem of heterogeneous beliefs over the rights of 
third parties. Rather, the point raised here is that a potentially important 
cause of contention within stateless societies has been glossed over. 
Still, there are two key theoretical objections to my argument that are 
worth addressing, not because they are well-established in the existing 
literature on anarchy, but because they seemingly give anarcho-capitalists 
license to dismiss my approach out of hand. First, one could object by asking 
why an institution as inefficient as the state would be able to resolve conflicts 
arising from heterogeneous perspectives on the rights of third parties, while 
the dynamic market process would not. Second, it could be argued that if 
consumers truly feel strongly about issues like abortion or animal rights, they 
would already be engaging in private efforts to exclude those they disagree 
with from the community, even in the presence of the state. In some ways, 
these types of arguments prove too much, as they make any criticism of 
anarcho-capitalism impossible (besides, perhaps, the Hobbesian criticism). 
Nevertheless, I will discuss both in the context of the rights of third parties. 
a. Taboo Tradeoffs under the State 
Free-market proponents are not inclined to believe in special social or 
economic roles only the state can fulfill. Governments are by and large 
remarkably inefficient, addressing seemingly any problem by providing 
poorer information and incentives than their private counterparts. The 
anarcho-capitalist proponent may ask, with some justification, why it is that 
the state can reconcile contentious social issues better than private 
institutions can, when governments are notorious for little more than 
corruption. 
The first point to recognize is that taboo tradeoffs appear very different 
when voting than when entertaining the possibility to accept a side payment. 
A vote for a candidate rarely demonstrates willingness to trade, say, $500 for 
the chance to live in a community that shares your values, even if that is what 
it means in practice. Choosing between two politicians may at times mean 
choosing the lesser of two evils, but it rarely requires voters to perceive 
themselves as accepting a cash payment in exchange for betraying their moral 
values. 
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Still, the anarcho-capitalist can hypothesize that even if the state is able 
to mitigate these violations of sacred values, an innovative private sector 
could surpass the state through marketing and sales techniques. However, 
this is most true when voting is viewed instrumentally, that is, as if it were 
intended to attain specific goals like wealth maximization. By contrast, the 
theory of expressive voting tells us that under democratic government these 
issues will rarely if ever cross voters’ minds (Brennan and Lomasky 1993; cf. 
Caplan 2007). Citizens vote to express the type of person they believe 
themselves to be, not to advance their own narrow self-interest. While we 
cannot discount altogether the notion that consumers make expressive 
consumption decisions on the market, this is not the point. Anarcho-
capitalist institutions would need to be artful in avoiding communicating that 
they are asking customers to engage in a taboo tradeoff. In contrast, voters 
believe they are never making taboo tradeoffs when voting to begin with. 
One may not like one’s chosen candidate’s record on abortion, but rarely 
does one perceive voting to be tantamount to accepting a side payment in 
exchange for shutting down abortion clinics. 
Similarly, identity economics should give us pause in considering which 
incentives are salient when people act as voters versus as consumers. Of 
course, people do not become more angelic when they are voters. But 
identity economics reminds us of the significance of whether people see 
themselves as acting inside or outside the law. Violent conflict cannot occur 
without the permission of the state without people acting outside the law, by 
definition. And while it is possible for an analogous norm to evolve in an 
anarcho-capitalist community, it is hardly obvious that we should see as 
acting outside the law those who establish firms to enforce their own 
perspective on the rights of third parties. Under democracy, we certainly 
should. 
An additional criticism of the public’s attitude toward government and 
collective action gives credence to the idea that taboo tradeoffs are perceived 
differently in societies governed by states. Klein (2005) argues that the public 
accords far too much power to explicit collective action under the state. In 
what he calls “the people’s romance,” the public romanticizes the actions of 
government while giving it the right to perform certain actions not 
authorized for any other group. Klein aims to demonstrate that this fact helps 
explain why the public supports many catastrophic policies while excusing 
actions that all would be condemned as morally reprehensible if an individual 
or nonstate group performed them. This may explain why the public accords 
the state the right to declare what the law is while obviating the need for 
individuals to make taboo tradeoffs explicitly. 
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Some of these points are speculative, but pointing out such a quandary 
as how the rights of third parties are protected under anarcho-capitalism 
hardly demonstrates a failure to understand the limits and danger of state 
power. The simple reason why democracies need not confront the issue as 
they would under anarcho-capitalism may be that voters romanticize 
themselves as law-abiding, altruistic citizens, to the detriment of nonpolitical 
solutions. This blindness often causes democracies to enact bad policies, but 
it may also make voters blind to the taboo choices that must be made in a 
pluralist society. For a private entity to be similarly successful, it must 
somehow cultivate the same romance that most individuals readily accord the 
state. 
b. Current Private Institutions 
One argument made frequently in response to criticisms of anarcho-
capitalism, though rarely in print, is what I call the condo association argument.12 
This argument states that we can test whether anarcho-capitalist institutions 
engage in certain behaviors by observing the actions of private associations as 
they exist today. While some restrictions on private agreements exist (e.g., 
laws restricting housing covenants), generally in modern societies individuals 
may choose how they associate with one another. The classic example is the 
condo association. In many ways, these private contractual relationships are 
similar to those anarcho-capitalists expect to see under their favored system. 
If individuals really were willing to pay to enforce their moral views, the 
condo association argument claims that something like a condo association 
would exist requiring those who live in the community to agree to live by 
their rules. For example, this could mean abstaining from consuming animal 
products or ever undergoing an abortion. That people are unwilling to 
organize their communities in this way is taken to be strong evidence that, 
when confronted with the costs of enforcement, individuals would be 
unwilling to pay for it. 
What makes this argument perplexing is that it destabilizes other free-
market arguments. For example, it undercuts the argument that the FDA 
should be replaced by private institutions (cf. Klein 1998). There are no (or 
few) institutions evaluating the safety of food and drugs today in private 
markets. This, however, obviously does not provide evidence that private 
institutions would fail to fill the gap if the FDA were to be eliminated. In 
                                                          
12 For an allusion to this type of argument, cf. Stringham (1999). 
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other words, the government is currently crowding out good private 
institutions. 
But if it is possible that the government crowds out good private 
institutions, why can it not crowd out bad private institutions too? A condo 
association or other similar private institution presently available is a clumsy 
way of curtailing abortion or the consumption of animal products. Those 
who believe a fetus is an unborn child likely want to use the police—whether 
public or private—to protect the rights of children generally. In the presence 
of the state, attempts to do so are either crowded out or declared illegal. It is 
hard to imagine that anyone arguing in good faith would believe the most 
logical and efficient way to address the issue in the absence of the state is to 
file a complaint with the condo association manager. 
The condo association argument offers a reasonable sanity check for 
some criticisms of anarcho-capitalism, but if applied as a trump card to issues 
to which it is inapplicable, it only squelches honest criticisms. Such is the 
claim that the lack of condo associations and similar institutions privately 
regulating abortions or animal products provides evidence that these issues 
would be minor difficulties in the absence of the state. 
V. Conclusion 
The literature on anarcho-capitalism has effectively challenged the 
Hobbesian idea that society will degenerate into a war of all against all in the 
absence of a state. But it addresses only one particular form of conflict. This 
paper has argued that taboo tradeoffs will prevent anarcho-capitalism, as 
typically described, from mitigating conflict regarding the rights of third 
parties. There is no guarantee that markets will be capable of finding answers 
to questions such as whether abortions or the consumption of animal 
products will be legal in a community. This is not to argue that individual 
actors are irrational, but that for certain types of questions they need to 
receive a premium in exchange for engaging in a transaction. Ironically, the 
reason states might be capable of dealing with such issues is closely related to 
one reason they perform poorly in other respects: individuals romanticize 
collective action, and do not perceive tradeoffs in the same way when acting 
in the political sphere. The reason we do not observe individuals privately 
enforcing their beliefs today is simply that the mechanisms to enforce them 
are crowded out by the state. Proponents of anarcho-capitalism must study 
more how anarcho-capitalist institutions can resolve non-Hobbesian 
conflicts, including conflicts regarding differing beliefs over the rights of third 
parties. 
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